Anti-corruption measures in lending agreements
Title III — International Monetary Fund
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Title XV of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262o–262o–4) is further amended by adding at the end the following: 1509. Anti-corruption measures in lending agreements The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund to use the voice and vote of the United States to encourage— (1) the incorporation into Fund lending agreements of anti-corruption measures, including by ensuring that governments receiving loans make specific, measurable, and time-bound commitments as part of the loan agreements with consequences for noncompliance, which commitments should be tailored to the needs of each country, made in consultation with local civil society organizations, and made in consideration with baselines for proper governance worldwide, such as through beneficial ownership registries, transparent and competitive public contracting, asset declarations for public officials, a strong anti-money laundering and combating terrorist financing regime, robust oversight by independent government entities and civil society organizations, and independent judiciaries; (2) the production and publication of more governance diagnostics as part of loan programs, the urging of governments to agree to the exercise and to make the reports public on completion, incorporating recommendations of the diagnostics as commitments, and the continuation of leveraging Article IV consultations and Financial Sector Assessment Programs to elevate anticorruption and financial integrity issues among their broader economic and policy analysis; (3) the engagement of in-country civil society organizations (CSOs) and local experts throughout loan programs, including by— (A) consulting CSOs at the outset of negotiations to help inform Fund staff assessments of loan program priorities; (B) providing updates to and request input from CSOs during the program development process, and (C) ensuring sufficient access to information and resources for CSO monitoring of commitment implementation, without threats or other retaliation by governments if there are honest critiques raised by a CSO; (4) the improvement of transparency by including on the Funds country pages, on the website of the Fund, a list of the prior actions and structural benchmarks included in loan programs, and pursuing a consistent cross-country approach to assessing government implementation and linking findings to surveillance and lending transparency; (5) the holding of governments accountable to their commitments, by— (A) ensuring that governments credibly carry out commitments; (B) refraining from issuing waivers of non-observance for benchmarks related to governance and financial integrity due to lack of political will; and (C) promptly publishing audits; and (6) the public reporting of the progress of implementing the governance commitments that governments make as part of the loan agreements..