Findings

Congress makes the following findings: (1) Sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure poses a growing threat to United States and allied security and economic prosperity. (2) In recent years, numerous critical undersea infrastructure sites were destroyed or damaged, including— (A) in January 2022, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables connecting the Norwegian mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, home of SvalSAT, the largest commercial satellite ground station on Earth; (B) in September 2022, the reported damage to 3 of the 4 trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast of the Danish island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea; (C) in February 2023, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting the main island of Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait; (D) in October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Estonia Balticconnector natural gas pipeline spanning the Gulf of Finland, in addition to the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables connecting Estonia and Sweden and Finland and Estonia; (E) in November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea telecommunications cables and the Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea telecommunications cable in the Central Baltic Sea; (F) in December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable and nearby subsea telecommunications cables in the Gulf of Finland; (G) in January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans-Pacific Express subsea telecommunications cable connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan, among other global democracies; (H) in February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea telecommunications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait; (I) in January 2026, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea linking Liepāja and Šventoji; and (J) in January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel named the Fitburg. (3) Following subsea fiber-optic cable cuts in the Baltic Sea in December 2024, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network to conduct information and threat intelligence sharing among private and public sector actors to protect subsea cables. (4) On February 21, 2025, the European Union published an EU Action Plan on Cable Security to include the development and deployment of an Integrated Surveillance Mechanism for Submarine cables work to establish a dedicated regional hub in the Baltic Sea to serve as a test bed of the integrated surveillance approach. (5) The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) published guidelines for Strengthening Resilience and Repair of Submarine Cables and most recently announced plans to build a secure, diverse and resilient submarine cable network and to facilitate the expeditious deployment, repair, maintenance, removal, and protection of submarine cables, between ASEAN Member States. (6) On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, met to reaffirm its commitment to the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience. In the meeting, the Quad underscored the need for digital infrastructure collaboration, organizing a subsea cables forum to be hosted by the United States and India and encouraging regulatory harmonization between Quad partners. Through this initiative, the Quad seeks to defend and promote resilient, secure, and transparent digital infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific region.