Report on activities by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation

(a) Report Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes the following: (1) A description, with respect to the applicable reporting period, of the subsea cable manufacturing, installation, and maintenance capabilities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation. (2) An analysis of the mission, capabilities, and activities of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, including— (A) a description of GUGI operations and capabilities in deep water and littoral infrastructure surveillance, seabed warfare, and sabotage, including recent activity trends and development of new weapons systems; (B) a description of GUGI’s use of ostensibly civilian research vessels to conduct critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, seabed warfare, and potential sabotage; (C) an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the ability of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and equipment, as well as its efforts to circumvent those sanctions; and (D) a list of suspected GUGI research or scientific vessels, including vessel names and International Maritime Organization and Maritime Mobile Service Identity numbers, and related equipment that are suspected of engaging in dual-use operations and probing of critical undersea infrastructure. (3) An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and activities of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), including— (A) a description of GRU operations and capabilities related to physical, electronic, and cyber surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure and maritime logistics; (B) a description of the use of Russian civilian merchant and fishing vessels by the GRU, including a list of fishing and merchant vessel names and International Maritime Organization and Maritime Mobile Service Identity Numbers believed to be involved in surveillance or sabotage activities; and (C) an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the ability of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and equipment, as well as its efforts to circumvent those sanctions. (4) An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and activities of the People’s Liberation Army, the PRC Coast Guard, the China Ship Scientific Research Center, HMN Technologies, and other PRC-based entities, including unmarked or dual-use maritime militia or commercial vessels related to surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including— (A) a description of recent capability developments related to surveilling or sabotaging critical undersea infrastructure, including for both deep-sea and littoral purposes; and (B) a description of the PRC’s use of ostensibly civilian fishing, merchant, and research vessels for sabotage or surveillance of critical undersea infrastructure, including in the Indo-Pacific, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere. (5) An assessment of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the PRC on surveillance or sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including— (A) any current or planned operational coordination against United States or allied and partner nation targets; (B) any joint research, development, testing, or evaluation of critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare capabilities; (C) any technology transfers or joint training related to critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare; and (D) any coordination in procurement of advanced technologies related to critical undersea infrastructure, surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare, or circumvention of sanctions against the Russian Federation. (6) A list of instances during the previous calendar year in which the United States, or allies and partners of the United States, documented anomalous behavior from vessels, either flagged, crewed, or operated by the PRC or Russia, around critical undersea infrastructure, including— (A) any official United States Government response to counter the anomalous behavior; and (B) any coordinated diplomatic action with allies and partners. (7) An assessment of the extent to which PRC-based entities are involved in laying, maintaining, and repairing United States-invested cables. (b) Initial and subsequent reports The initial report required under subsection (a) shall cover the period between January 1, 2022, through the date of the enactment of this Act. Subsequent reports required by subsection (a) shall cover the previous calendar year for the reporting period. (c) Classification The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.