Report on potential sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes the assessment of the intelligence community, including dissents from individual agencies, of the likely cause and, if applicable, the attribution of the following instances of reported sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure: (1) In January 2022, the reported damage to the subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting the Norwegian mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard. (2) The September 2022 sabotage of three of the four trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast of the Danish island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea, including— (A) an assessment of the activities of Russian military vessels, including those with undersea warfare capabilities, at any of the Nord Stream blast sites in the months leading up to the incident; (B) a description of any Russian civilian or military vessels intercepted or diverted from the blast sites in the aftermath of the sabotage or vessels or underwater unmanned vehicles that gained access to the blast sites; (C) an assessment of the technical feasibility of a small group of divers conducting the Nord Stream sabotage using the rental boat Andromeda in the weather and sea conditions present at the time; (D) an assessment of whether the Russian Federation’s documented practice of recruiting or coercing Ukrainians or other third country nationals to conduct sabotage operations on land targets is applicable to a maritime context; (E) an assessment of the fees and penalties for failure to honor gas delivery contracts that Gazprom or other Russian entities potentially faced due to the throttling of gas deliveries via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline in 2021; (F) an assessment of the insurance implications for Nord Stream 1 and 2, as well as its insurers and Western financiers, depending on the identity of the perpetrator; (G) a description of the law enforcement investigations by regional governments, the scope of their investigations, and their outcomes; (H) an assessment of whether any Russian vessels documented in close proximity to the Nord Stream blast sites in the months leading up to or immediately after the incident, including those with undersea surveillance or warfare capabilities, were present at other suspected sabotage sites either before or after the incident in question; and (I) any information on potential attribution received from allied or partner nation communications through diplomatic or intelligence channels. (3) In February 2023, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting the main island of Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait. (4) In October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Estonia Baltic connector natural gas pipeline, in addition to subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting Estonia and Sweden and Finland and Estonia. (5) In November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea telecommunications cable and the Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea telecommunications cable in the Central Baltic Sea. (6) In December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable and nearby subsea telecommunications cables in the Gulf of Finland. (7) In January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans-Pacific Express subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan, among other global democracies. (8) In February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea telecommunications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait. (9) In January 2026, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea connecting Liepāja and Šventoji. (10) In January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel called the Fitburg.