Findings

Congress finds the following: (1) The collapse of Iraqi security forces in Mosul and elsewhere in 2014 enabled the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to capture and exploit significant quantities of United States-origin and United States-provided equipment. (2) The collapse of Afghan security forces in 2021 resulted in the acquisition by the Taliban and other hostile actors of substantial United States-funded defense equipment. (3) The United States Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction found that the Taliban likely gained access to approximately $57,600,000 in funds provided by the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the United States Agency for International Development to the former Afghan government. (4) The Department of Defense reported that it left at least $7,100,000,000 in United States-funded defense equipment in Afghanistan upon the United States departure in 2021. (5) According to news reporting from June through August 2021, the Taliban captured significant quantities of United States-provided vehicles and equipment from Afghan security forces prior to the collapse of the former Afghan government, including, in at least one reported period, approximately 700 trucks and Humvees, and reporting citing a United States official and an intelligence assessment indicated the Taliban was believed to control more than 2,000 armored vehicles and dozens of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, following the collapse. (6) Department of Defense oversight reporting found that interagency information regarding funds and equipment left behind in Afghanistan was limited, and that the agencies lacked plans to recover such funds or equipment. (7) Credible news reporting in May 2015, citing statements by Iraqi government officials, indicated that ISIL captured approximately 2,300 Humvee armored vehicles from Iraqi security forces in Mosul in 2014. Credible reporting further indicated that ISIL converted captured United States-provided Humvee vehicles into vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, including suicide car bombs, and employed such devices against Iraqi and Kurdish partner forces. (8) Iranian-backed militia and proxy networks operating in Iraq and Syria have demonstrated the capability and intent to infiltrate, influence, or exploit partner security institutions and logistics nodes, increasing the risk that United States-origin defense equipment may be diverted, transferred, or otherwise accessed by state-backed proxy forces. (9) Any decisions regarding force reposturing or withdrawal should be predicated on comprehensive equipment accountability, cost transparency, and partner force resiliency assessments to mitigate the risk of diversion. (10) Disposition decisions should leverage a full spectrum of options—including retrograde, destruction, and sale to identify cost-neutral or cost-offsetting solutions for surplus equipment. (11) Current Department of Defense property accountability and security assistance monitoring frameworks lack the systemic integration necessary to provide Congress with timely, comprehensive accounting or cost-benefit analyses regarding equipment disposition during force withdrawals or significant reposturing.