Ensuring intelligence community procurement of domestic United States production of synthetic DNA and RNA

(a) In general Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such other heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall establish a policy to ensure that elements of the intelligence community may not contract with Chinese biotechnology suppliers that are determined by the Director to pose a security threat. (b) Elements The policy required by subsection (a) shall include that an element of the intelligence community may not procure or obtain any product made using synthetic DNA or RNA unless— (1) the final assembly or processing of the product occurs in the United States; (2) all significant processing of the product occurs in the United States; and (3) all or nearly all ingredients or components of the product are made and sourced in the United States. (c) Waiver The Director of National Intelligence may waive the application of the policy required by subsection (a) to allow purchases prohibited by such policy if the purpose of such a purchase fulfills a national security need. (d) Definitions In this section: (1) Chinese biotechnology supplier The term Chinese biotechnology supplier means a supplier of biotechnology that is organized under the laws of, or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of, the People's Republic of China. (2) Synthetic DNA or RNA The term synthetic DNA or RNA means any nucleic acid sequence that is produced de novo through chemical or enzymatic synthesis.