Criteria for redistricting

(a) Requiring plans To meet criteria A State may not use a congressional redistricting plan that is not in compliance with this section. (b) Ranked criteria Under the redistricting plan of a State, there shall be established single-member congressional districts using the following criteria as set forth in the following order of priority: (1) Districts shall comply with the United States Constitution, including the requirement that they substantially equalize total population. (2) Districts shall comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. 10301 et seq.), including by creating any districts where, if based upon the totality of the circumstances, 2 or more politically cohesive groups protected by such Act are able to elect representatives of choice in coalition with one another, and all applicable Federal laws. (3) (A) Districts shall be drawn, to the extent that the totality of the circumstances warrant, to ensure the practical ability of a group protected under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. 10301 et seq.) to participate in the political process and to nominate candidates and to elect representatives of choice is not diluted or diminished, regardless of whether or not such protected group constitutes a majority of a district’s citizen voting age population. (B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the assessment of whether a protected group has the practical ability to nominate candidates and to elect representatives of choice shall require the consideration of the following factors: (i) Whether the group is politically cohesive. (ii) Whether there is racially polarized voting in the relevant geographic region. (iii) If there is racially polarized voting in the relevant geographic region, whether the preferred candidates of the group nevertheless receive a sufficient amount of consistent crossover support from other voters such that the group is a functional majority with the ability to both nominate candidates and elect representatives of choice. (4) (A) Districts shall be drawn to represent communities of interest and neighborhoods to the extent practicable after compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (1) through (3). A community of interest is defined as an area for which the record before the entity responsible for developing and adopting the redistricting plan demonstrates the existence of broadly shared interests and representational needs, including shared interests and representational needs rooted in common ethnic, racial, economic, Indian, social, cultural, geographic, or historic identities, or arising from similar socioeconomic conditions. The term communities of interest may, if the record warrants, include political subdivisions such as counties, municipalities, Indian lands, or school districts, but shall not include common relationships with political parties or political candidates. (B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), in considering the needs of multiple, overlapping communities of interest, the entity responsible for developing and adopting the redistricting plan shall give greater weight to those communities of interest whose representational needs would most benefit from the community’s inclusion in a single congressional district. (c) No favoring or disfavoring of political parties (1) Prohibition A State may not use a redistricting plan to conduct an election that, when considered on a statewide basis, has been drawn with the intent or has the effect of materially favoring or disfavoring any political party. (2) Determination of effect The determination of whether a redistricting plan has the effect of materially favoring or disfavoring a political party shall be based on an evaluation of the totality of circumstances which, at a minimum, shall involve consideration of each of the following factors: (A) Computer modeling based on relevant statewide general elections for Federal office held over the 8 years preceding the adoption of the redistricting plan setting forth the probable electoral outcomes for the plan under a range of reasonably foreseeable conditions. (B) An analysis of whether the redistricting plan is statistically likely to result in partisan advantage or disadvantage on a statewide basis, the degree of any such advantage or disadvantage, and whether such advantage or disadvantage is likely to be present under a range of reasonably foreseeable electoral conditions. (C) A comparison of the modeled electoral outcomes for the redistricting plan to the modeled electoral outcomes for alternative plans that demonstrably comply with the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (b) in order to determine whether reasonable alternatives exist that would result in materially lower levels of partisan advantage or disadvantage on a statewide basis. For purposes of this subparagraph, alternative plans considered may include both actual plans proposed during the redistricting process and other plans prepared for purposes of comparison. (D) Any other relevant information, including how broad support for the redistricting plan was among members of the entity responsible for developing and adopting the plan and whether the processes leading to the development and adoption of the plan were transparent and equally open to all members of the entity and to the public. (3) Rebuttable presumption (A) Trigger In any civil action brought under section 402 in which a party asserts a claim that a State has enacted a redistricting plan which is in violation of this subsection, a party may file a motion not later than 30 days after the enactment of the plan (or, if later, not later than 30 days after the effective date of this Act) requesting that the court determine whether a presumption of such a violation exists. If such a motion is timely filed, the court shall hold a hearing not later than 15 days after the date the motion is filed to assess whether a presumption of such a violation exists. (B) Assessment To conduct the assessment required under subparagraph (A), the court shall do the following: (i) Determine the number of congressional districts under the plan that would have been carried by each political party’s candidates for the office of President and the office of Senator in the 2 most recent general elections for the office of President and the 2 most recent general elections for the office of Senator (other than special general elections) immediately preceding the enactment of the plan, except that if a State conducts a primary election for the office of Senator which is open to candidates of all political parties, the primary election shall be used instead of the general election and the number of districts carried by a party’s candidates for the office of Senator shall be determined on the basis of the combined vote share of all candidates in the election who are affiliated with such party. (ii) Determine, for each of the 4 elections assessed under clause (i), whether the number of districts that would have been carried by any party’s candidate as determined under clause (i) results in partisan advantage or disadvantage in excess of 7 percent or one congressional district, whichever is greater, as determined by standard quantitative measures of partisan fairness that relate a party's share of the statewide vote to that party's share of seats. (C) Presumption of violation A plan is presumed to violate paragraph (1) if it exceeds the threshold described in clause (ii) of subparagraph (B) with respect to 2 or more of the 4 elections assessed under such subparagraph. (D) Stay of use of plan Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, in any action under this paragraph, the following rules shall apply: (i) Upon filing of a motion under subparagraph (A), a State’s use of the plan which is the subject of the motion shall be automatically stayed pending resolution of such motion. (ii) If after considering the motion, the court rules that the plan is presumed under subparagraph (C) to violate paragraph (1), a State may not use such plan until and unless the court which is carrying out the determination of the effect of the plan under paragraph (2) determines that, notwithstanding the presumptive violation, the plan does not violate paragraph (1). (E) No effect on other assessments The absence of a presumption of a violation with respect to a redistricting plan as determined under this paragraph shall not affect the determination of the effect of the plan under paragraph (2). (4) Determination of intent A court may rely on all available evidence when determining whether a redistricting plan was drawn with the intent to materially favor or disfavor a political party, including evidence of the partisan effects of a plan, the degree of support the plan received from members of the entity responsible for developing and adopting the plan, and whether the processes leading to development and adoption of the plan were transparent and equally open to all members of the entity and to the public. (5) No violation based on certain criteria No redistricting plan shall be found to be in violation of paragraph (1) because of the proper application of the criteria set forth in paragraphs (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (b), unless one or more alternative plans could have complied with such paragraphs without having the effect of materially favoring or disfavoring a political party. (d) Factors prohibited from consideration In developing the redistricting plan for the State, the State may not take into consideration any of the following factors, except as necessary to comply with the criteria described in paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (b), to achieve partisan fairness and comply with subsection (b), and to enable the redistricting plan to be measured against the external metrics described in section 203(d): (1) The residence of any Member of the House of Representatives or candidate. (2) The political party affiliation or voting history of the population of a district. (e) Additional criteria A State may not rely upon criteria not set forth in this section to justify non-compliance with the requirements of this section. (f) Applicability This section applies to any authority, whether appointed, elected, judicial, or otherwise, responsible for enacting the congressional redistricting plan of a State. (g) Severability of criteria If any of the criteria set forth in this section, or the application of such criteria to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remaining criteria set forth in this section, and the application of such criteria to any person or circumstance, shall not be affected by the holding.