Limitations on certain uses of artificial intelligence by the Department

(a) In general The Department may not— (1) use artificial intelligence for the selection of targets for the use of a nuclear weapon or for the execution of launching or detonating a nuclear weapon; (2) except as provided in subparagraph (b), use artificial intelligence to acquire, collect, ingest, retain, query, correlate, analyze, or disseminate information concerning a United States person located in the United States for the purpose of— (A) identifying or resolving the identity of such person across datasets; (B) tracking or conducting pattern-of-life analysis of such person; (C) conducting link analysis regarding the associations, contacts, activities, or movements of such person; (D) assigning a risk score, threat score, or other predictive assessment to such person; (E) creating or maintaining a watchlist, dossier, targeting package, or other persistent person-centric analytic product regarding such person; or (F) selecting such person for investigative, operational, or law enforcement attention, unless such activity is expressly authorized by Federal law and supported by a lawful and documented predicate; or (3) develop, procure, field, or employ an autonomous weapon system, except as provided in subsection (d). (b) Rule of construction Subsection (a) shall not be construed to prohibit the use of artificial intelligence— (1) for cybersecurity, information assurance, threat detection, vulnerability management, malware analysis, incident response, or defensive cyberspace operations undertaken to protect the Department of Defense Information Network, information systems, weapons systems, military networks, or defense critical infrastructure of the Department from malicious cyber activity; (2) for force protection or counterintelligence purposes to identify, assess, or warn of a specific, credible, and articulable threat to personnel, installations, facilities, operations, activities, or covered assets of the Department; or (3) with the informed consent of the person concerned. (c) Additional limitations on domestic uses The Department may not use artificial intelligence— (1) solely on the basis of activity protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or the lawful exercise of any other right secured by the Constitution of the United States or the laws of the United States; or (2) to acquire, correlate, or analyze publicly available information, commercially available information, or hacked, leaked, or breached data that is posted online or made available for sale for the primary purpose of circumventing otherwise applicable constitutional, statutory, or regulatory protections governing collection, retention, querying, or dissemination of information by the Federal Government concerning United States persons. (d) Exceptions for autonomous weapon systems Subsection (a)(3) shall not apply to the following, provided that any such system satisfies the conditions of subsection (e): (1) Semi-autonomous weapon systems used to apply lethal or non-lethal, kinetic or non-kinetic force, so long as such semi-autonomous weapon systems do not include any mode of operation in which the semi-autonomous weapon system is intended to function as an autonomous weapon system. (2) Operator-supervised autonomous weapon systems used to select and engage materiel targets for local defense to intercept attempted time-critical or saturation attacks for— (A) static defense of installations with personnel, including networked defense in which the autonomous weapon system is not co-located with the installation; or (B) onboard or networked defense of platforms with onboard personnel. (3) Interception of surface-to-air missiles. (4) Autonomous weapon systems used to apply non-lethal, non-kinetic force against materiel targets in accordance with Department of Defense Directive 3000.03E. (e) Conditions on excepted systems A system described in subsection (d) may be developed, procured, fielded, or employed only if the Secretary certifies that such system— (1) has undergone legal review for consistency with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement; (2) has completed rigorous verification and validation and realistic developmental and operational testing and evaluation under conditions that reflect the intended operational environment and reasonably anticipated adversary countermeasures; (3) is designed and fielded to permit commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force; (4) includes human-machine interfaces and controls that— (A) are readily understandable to trained operators; (B) provide transparent feedback on system status; (C) provide clear procedures for activation and deactivation of system functions; and (D) for operator-supervised autonomous weapon systems, permit operators to intervene and terminate engagements before unacceptable levels of damage occur, including in the event of weapon system failure; (5) is approved for use only within defined temporal, geographic, environmental, and operational constraints, and, if unable to complete an engagement consistent with such constraints, is designed to terminate the engagement or obtain additional operator input before continuing; and (6) uses technologies and data sources that are, to the maximum extent practicable consistent with military necessity, transparent to, auditable by, and explainable to relevant personnel. (f) Certification and notification (1) In general Not later than 30 days before fielding a system pursuant to subsection (d), the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a written certification that the system falls within one of the exceptions under subsection (d) and satisfies the conditions of subsection (e). (2) Contents A certification under paragraph (1) shall include— (A) the exception under subsection (d) on which the Department relies; (B) a summary of the legal review conducted under subsection (e)(1); (C) the intended mission set, target class, and operational concept for the system; (D) the temporal, geographic, environmental, and operational constraints approved for the system; (E) a description of the operator supervision concept, including procedures for intervention, termination, activation, and deactivation; (F) a summary of testing, verification, and validation conducted for the system; and (G) any substantial modification to the system’s algorithms, intended mission set, intended operational environment, intended target set, or expected adversarial countermeasures since any prior certification submitted under this subsection.