Advanced review and approval authority

(a) General requirement for advanced review With the exception of systems described in subsection (e), the Secretary shall ensure that each system described in section 3(a)(2) is approved in accordance with this section before formal development and before fielding. (b) Pre-Development review Before a decision to enter formal development of a system described in subsection (a), the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall jointly verify that— (1) the weapon system design incorporates the necessary capabilities to allow a designated commander to exercise ultimate discretion, judgment, and control over the use of force in the envisioned planning, deployment, and use processes for the weapon; (2) the system is designed to complete engagements within a designated timeframe and designated geographic area and against a designated set of potential targets, as well as other applicable parameters, consistent with designated commander intentions, and if unable to do so, to terminate use until additional human operator and commander evaluation is completed before continuing the engagement; (3) the combination of the system’s design and concept of use, including its target selection and engagement logic, accounts for risks of armed conflict, including to civilians, civilian populations, civilian objects, and other protected entities, consistent with commander and human operator intent and obligations under the Law of Armed Conflict, or other relevant laws of the United States and international laws; (4) the system design, including system safety, anti-tamper mechanisms, and cybersecurity, addresses and minimizes the probability and consequences of failures; (5) plans are in place for verification and validation and test and evaluation to establish system reliability, effectiveness, predictability of effects, and accuracy under realistic conditions, including possible adversary actions, interference, or unintended consequences; (6) for systems incorporating artificial intelligence capabilities, plans are in place to ensure consistency with the Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence and the Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway; and (7) a thorough legal analysis, review, and risk assessment of a system described in subsection (a) has been completed in coordination with the General Counsel of the Department and other relevant Department General Counsels and in accordance with applicable directives governing the Defense Acquisition System, the Department of Defense Law of War Program, the Law of Armed Conflict, and other relevant laws of the United States and international laws. (c) Pre-Fielding review Before fielding a system described in subsection (a), the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall jointly verify that— (1) system capabilities, human-machine interfaces, doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and training have been demonstrated to allow a designated commander to exercise ultimate discretion, control, and judgment over the use of force and to use systems whose outcomes are sufficiently accurate with thorough legal analysis in accordance with the law of war, Law of Armed Conflict, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and rules of engagement reasonably expected to be applicable; (2) system safety, anti-tamper mechanisms, cyber survivability, operational resilience, and cybersecurity capabilities have been implemented to minimize the probability and consequences of failures, including unpredictable outcomes, and a monitoring protocol is in place to identify and address changes in operational environment, data inputs, and use that could contribute to such failures; (3) verification and validation and test and evaluation have— (A) assessed system performance, capability, reliability, risk margins, effectiveness, and suitability under realistic conditions, including possible adversary actions, interference, or unintended consequences; and (B) have demonstrated that the system can be revised as needed with sufficient rapidity to enable timely correction of any unintended system behaviors that may be observed or discovered during future system operations; (4) adequate training, tactics, techniques, procedures, and doctrine are available, quarterly reviewed, and used by system operators and commanders to understand the functioning, capabilities, and limitations of the system in real world conditions; (5) system design and human-machine interfaces are readily understandable to trained human operators, provide transparent feedback on system status, provide secure logging to enable traceability, and provide clear procedures for trained human operators to activate and terminate system functions; (6) for systems incorporating artificial intelligence capabilities, the deployment and use of such capabilities in the weapon system will be consistent with the Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence, the Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway, the Law of Armed Conflict, and other relevant laws of the United States and international laws; and (7) a legal review of the compliance of the weapon system with the Defense Acquisition System, the Department of Defense Law of War Program, the Law of Armed Conflict, and other relevant laws of the United States and international laws has been completed in coordination with the General Counsel of the Department. (d) Re-Review of modified systems A system described in subsection (a) that is a variant of an existing weapon system previously approved through the review process under this section shall not be covered by previous approval if changes to the system algorithms, intended mission set, intended operational environments, intended target sets, or expected adversarial countermeasures materially differ from those applicable to the previously approved weapon system. Such systems shall require a new analysis, review, and risk assessment before formal development and again before fielding. (e) Systems not requiring advanced review (1) In general Except as provided in paragraph (2), the advance review described in this section is not required for weapon systems intended to be used in the following manners: (A) Semi-autonomous weapon systems used to apply lethal or non-lethal, kinetic or non-kinetic, force without capability to function as an autonomous weapon system. (B) Human operator-supervised autonomous weapon systems used to select and engage materiel targets for local defense to intercept attempted time-critical or saturation attacks for— (i) static defense of installations with personnel, including networked defense where the autonomous weapon system is not co-located with the installation; or (ii) onboard or networked defense of platforms with onboard personnel. (C) Human operator-supervised autonomous weapon systems used to select and engage materiel targets for purpose of protecting remotely piloted or autonomous vehicles and vessels. (D) Autonomous weapon systems used to apply non-lethal, non-kinetic force against materiel targets. (2) Exception Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a weapon system intended to be used in the manner described in subparagraph (B) of such paragraph in a case in which the engagement zone for the system encompasses densely populated areas or essential civilian infrastructure. In such a case, the weapon system shall undergo the advanced review described in this section to certify that the system can effectively distinguish between military targets and non-combatants or civilian objects in high-clutter environments.