Enabling testing of frontier artificial intelligence models prior to public release

(a) Definitions In this section: (1) Board The term Board means the Artificial Intelligence Risk Board established under subsection (b)(1). (2) Critical infrastructure The term critical infrastructure has the meaning provided in section 1016(e) of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)). (3) Frontier artificial intelligence model The term frontier artificial intelligence model means an artificial intelligence model, or system combining multiple artificial intelligence models, that exhibits or could be modified to exhibit high levels of performance at tasks that pose a serious risk to national security, national economic security, or public health or safety. (4) Institute The term Institute means the National Institute of Standards and Technology. (5) Secretary The term Secretary means the Secretary of Commerce. (b) The Artificial Intelligence Risk Board (1) Establishment (A) In general Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall establish within the Institute a board to address artificial intelligence risks. (B) Designation The board established under subparagraph (A) shall be known as the Artificial Intelligence Risk Board. (2) Membership (A) Composition The Board shall be composed of members who are appointed as follows: (i) One or more members selected by the Director of the National Institute of Standards. (ii) One or more members selected by the Secretary. (iii) One or more members selected by the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (iv) One or more members selected by the Director of the National Security Agency. (v) One or more members selected by the Secretary of the Treasury. (B) Nongovernmental experts In addition to the members of the Board appointed under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall appoint members who are not officers or employees of the Federal Government and who the Secretary selects from among individuals who— (i) are leading technical experts not affiliated with a developer or provider of artificial intelligence systems; (ii) are leading technical experts affiliated with developers or providers of artificial intelligence systems; (iii) are individuals with expertise in developing evaluations to test artificial intelligence models; and (iv) have knowledge or expertise that the Secretary determines would further the purpose of the duties of the Board. (3) Terms and vacancies (A) Terms Each member of the Board shall serve 1 term of not longer than 3 years and may be reappointed for 1 successive term of not longer than 3 years. (B) Vacancy replacement The memebrs of the Board shall develop a vacancy replacement procedure that includes— (i) for vacancies occurring due to the end of a member’s term, a vote not later than 90 days before the last day of the member’s term; and (ii) for vacancies occurring under subparagraph (C) or for any other reason, the chair of the Board shall nominate a replacement from the same stakeholder category under paragraph (2), to the extent practicable, as the member creating the vacancy, subject to approval by a majority vote of the members of the Board. (C) Removal Any member who fails to comply with the conflict of interest policy adopted pursuant to paragraph (5)(D) shall be removed from the Board. (D) Chair The chair of the Board shall be selected by a majority vote among a quorum of the members appointed under paragraph (2) and shall serve not more than 1 two-year term. (4) Member access to classified information (A) Access (i) In general Not later than 60 days after the date on which a member is first appointed to the Board and before the member is granted access to any classified information necessary to participate in a closed session pursuant to paragraph (5)(F), the Secretary shall determine, for the purposes of the Board, if the member should be restricted from reviewing, discussing, or possessing classified information. (ii) Management Access to classified information shall be managed in accordance with Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national security information), or any subsequent corresponding Executive order. (iii) Clearance requirement The Secretary shall sponsor each member of the Board for a security clearance at the Top Secret level with access to sensitive compartmented information, as appropriate, for the purposes of participating in carrying out the duties of the Board. (iv) Clearance requirement Each member of the Board shall obtain a security clearance unless denied by the appropriate authorities or if the Secretary determines a member should be restricted from reviewing, discussing, or possessing classified information. In either instance, such member shall be removed from the Board and a new member shall be appointed pursuant to the vacancy procedures under paragraph (3)(B) to replace such removed member. (B) Protection of information A member of the Board granted access to classified information shall protect the classified information in accordance with the applicable requirements for the particular level of classification of the information. (C) Rule of construction Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to affect the existing security clearance of a member of the Board or the authority of a Federal agency to provide or deny a member of the Board access to any specific pieces of classified information. (5) Procedures (A) Designated federal officer The Secretary shall designate a Federal officer or employee to serve as the designated Federal officer of the Board, consistent with the requirements of chapter 10 of title 5, United States Code (common known as the Federal Advisory Committee Act). (B) Initial meeting and bylaws Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Board shall convene and establish bylaws that— (i) govern quorum and voting rules, including implementation of the decisionmaking majority voting requirement specified in paragraph (5)(C)(ii); and (ii) set deliverable timelines and meeting schedules. (C) Operating procedures Unless otherwise specified, the Board shall adopt written procedures governing its meetings, consistent with chapter 10 of title 5, United States Code, that include— (i) requirements for public notice of meetings and the maintenance of records and minutes; (ii) decision making by majority vote of those present and voting; (iii) authorization for the establishment of subgroups as necessary, subject to the approval of the chair of the Board; and (iv) approval of the meeting agendas by the chair in consultation with the designated Federal officer under subparagraph (A) to ensure compliance with applicable laws. (D) Conflict-of-interest policy (i) In general The Board shall adopt and enforce a written conflict of interest policy to ensure that members of the Board have a fiduciary responsibility to the Board, a duty to report conflicts of interest, including the appearance of a conflict of interest, and do not participate in deliberations or votes from which they personally or their employer would directly and materially benefit. (ii) Required disclosures The policy under clause (i) shall require each member to publicly disclose all relevant financial and employment relationships and include recusal procedures in the event of a conflict. (iii) Records The designated Federal officer under subparagraph (A) shall maintain records of disclosures under clause (ii) of this subparagraph and make summaries of the disclosures available to the Secretary. (E) Threat information access The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal entities, shall ensure that the Board has access to relevant cybersecurity threat information, including through closed or classified briefings or the provision of classified information, when appropriate. (F) Closed sessions Notwithstanding section 1009 of title 5, United States Code, the Board may hold closed or restricted-access sessions when the Secretary determines that the matters to be discussed involve any of the following: (i) Classified information. (ii) Sensitive cybersecurity vulnerabilities. (iii) Threat information. (iv) Proprietary business information. (v) Other information exempt from public disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code. (6) Duties (A) In general The Board shall— (i) develop a process to perform technical evaluations to determine what capabilities or combination of capabilities constitute high levels of performance at tasks that pose a serious risk to national security, national economic security, or public health or safety; and (ii) develop best practices, including— (I) standardize formats and processes for publishing model cards with technical details of artificial intelligence systems; (II) recommendations for maintaining cybersecurity measures for developers or providers of artificial intelligence systems; (III) processes and metrics for developers or providers of artificial intelligence systems to use to evaluate risks from employees or other personnel who have access to artificial intelligence systems developed or in development by developers or providers of artificial intelligence systems; and (IV) recommendations on appropriate financial and other resourcing for developers or providers of artificial intelligence systems to robustly engage in safety and security research focused on the deployment of frontier artificial intelligence models. (B) Periodic reassessment of technical evaluations and best practices The Board shall periodically reassess the technical evaluations and best practices the Board develops under this subsection. (c) Requirement that providers of frontier artificial intelligence models give access to National Security agency before public release Not later than 21 calendar days before a provider introduces into interstate or foreign commerce a frontier artificial intelligence model, the provider shall make available to the Artificial Intelligence Security Center, established by the Director of the National Security Agency under section 6504 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (division F of Public Law 118–159; 50 U.S.C. 3602 note), access to the frontier artificial intelligence model, including model's weights, configuration files, runtimes, or software libraries necessary to operate the frontier artificial intelligence model. (d) Frontier artificial intelligence model registry (1) Establishment of registry Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall establish a registry of frontier models that are available to the public. (2) Rules and procedures In establishing the registry under paragraph (1), the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall establish rules and procedures for— (A) a provider of a frontier artificial intelligence model to register the frontier artificial intelligence model; (B) a provider of a frontier artificial intelligence model to contest the need for registering the frontier artificial intelligence model; (C) removing a frontier artificial intelligence model from the registry; (D) a provider of a frontier artificial intelligence model to attest that the provider submitted the frontier artificial intelligence model to the test-bed established under section 6504(e) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (division F of Public Law 118–159; 50 U.S.C. 3602 note), as amended by subsection (e); and (E) such other purposes the Director deems necessary. (3) Obligation to register Each provider of a frontier artificial intelligence model shall register that frontier artificial intelligence model with the registry established under paragraph (1) before introducing the frontier artificial intelligence model into interstate or foreign commerce. (e) Enforcement; ability To cure (1) Referrals for enforcement In any case in which the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology determines that a frontier artificial intelligence model has been introduced into interstate or foreign commerce by a provider of the frontier artificial intelligence in violation of subsection (c), the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall notify the Attorney General. (2) Enforcement The Attorney General shall enforce this section. (3) Penalty Whoever violates subsection (c) shall be fined an amount equal to not less than $100,000 per day for each day during which a frontier artificial intelligence model controlled by that person is available through interstate and foreign commerce without having obtained the voluntary security guidance issued under section 6504(e)(3) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (division F of Public Law 118–159; 50 U.S.C. 3602 note), as amended by subsection (f). (4) Right to cure (A) Notification Prior to commending an enforcement action against a provider of a frontier artificial intelligence model for violating subsection (c), the Attorney General shall notify the provider and allow the provider 7 calendar days following the notice of violation for the violator to come into compliance pursuant to subparagraph (B). (B) Process to cure In order for a provider of a frontier artificial intelligence model to come into compliance pursuant to this subparagraph, the provider shall demonstrate to the Attorney General that the provider has— (i) withdrawn from interstate and foreign commerce the frontier artificial intelligence model that gave rise to the violation of subsection (c); and (ii) given to the National Security Agency access to the frontier artificial intelligence model pursuant to subsection (c). (f) National Security Agency research-Test-Bed Section 6504 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (division F of Public Law 118–159; 50 U.S.C. 3602 note) is amended— (1) in subsection (c)— (A) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and (B) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph (4): (3) Making available a research test-bed to private sector, Federal and qualified independent expert participants, on a subsidized basis, to engage in artificial intelligence security research, including through the secure provision of access in a secure environment for pre-deployment testing of any frontier artificial intelligence model prior to public release.; (2) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and (3) by inserting after subsection (d) the following: (e) Test-Bed requirements (1) Access and terms of usage (A) Outside participation The Director shall establish a process by which critical infrastructure operators, as well private sector entities that develop or maintain information systems utilized by critical infrastructure operators, shall access a secure test-bed for the purpose of testing and evaluating the impact of frontier artificial intelligence models on information systems maintained by critical infrastructure operators prior to public release or distribution of such models. (B) Researcher access The Director shall establish terms of usage governing access to the test-bed made available under subsection (c)(4), with limitations on researcher publication to the extent necessary to protect classified information or proprietary information provided by private sector participants. (C) Availability to federal agencies The Director shall ensure that the test-bed made available under subsection (c)(4) is also made available to other Federal agencies on a cost-recovery basis. (2) Use of certain infrastructure and other resources In carrying out subsection (c)(4), the Director shall leverage, to the greatest extent practicable, infrastructure and other resources provided under section 5.2 of Executive Order 14110 (88 Fed. Reg. 75191; relating to safe, secure, and trustworthy development and use of artificial intelligence). (3) Voluntary security guidance The Director shall share relevant guidance, informed by pre-deployment testing in the secure test-bed environment identified in subsection (c), to inform voluntary vendor actions to mitigate against potential security threats to such models, or the ability of foreign actors to utilize such models for computer network exploitation campaigns against information systems utilized by critical infrastructure operators, the design or development of weapons systems, or to further foreign surveillance capabilities..