Oversight of United States military posture on the Korean Peninsula

(a) Prohibition on use of funds Amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act may not be obligated or expended to reduce the approximate total number of members of the Armed Forces that are permanently stationed in, or deployed to, the Republic of Korea to below 28,500, or to complete the transition of wartime operational control of the United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command from United States-led command to Republic of Korea-led command, until the date that is 60 days after the date on which the certification described in subsection (b) and the applicable assessment described in subsection (c) are submitted to the appropriate committees of Congress. (b) Certification described The certification described in this subsection is a certification by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Commander of United States Forces Korea, the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, the Secretary of State, and the Director of National Intelligence, to the appropriate committees of Congress that, as applicable, a reduction in the approximate total number of members of the Armed Forces that are permanently stationed in, or deployed to, the Republic of Korea to below 28,500 or the completion of the transition of wartime operational control of the United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command from United States-led command— (1) is in the national security interest of the United States; and (2) is being undertaken only after appropriate consultations with allies of the United States, including the Republic of Korea, Japan, and any country that has sent military contributions to the United Nations Command. (c) Assessment described An assessment described in this subsection is the following: (1) In the case of a reduction in the total number of members of the Armed Forces permanently stationed in or deployed to the Republic of Korea to below 28,500, an assessment by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Commander of United States Forces Korea, the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, the Secretary of State, and the Director of National Intelligence that includes— (A) an analysis of the impact of such a reduction on— (i) the security of the United States; (ii) the security of the Republic of Korea and Japan; (iii) United States deterrence; and (iv) the defense posture of the United States Indo-Pacific Command; (B) an analysis of the impact of such a reduction on the ability of the Armed Forces to execute contingency plans of the Department of Defense, including in support of operations beyond the Korean Peninsula; (C) an analysis of the additional costs for relocation of personnel, equipment, and associated infrastructure; (D) an analysis of the impact of such a reduction on military training and major military exercises, including on interoperability and joint activities with the Republic of Korea and Japan; (E) a description of consultations with the Republic of Korea, Japan, and countries that have sent military contributions to the United Nations Command; (F) an assessment of the impact of a substantial reduction in the number of members of the Armed Forces permanently stationed in or deployed to the Republic of Korea on the credibility of United States extended deterrence commitments to the Republic of Korea and Japan, the potential for nuclear proliferation in the Indo-Pacific region, and the ability of the remaining forces permanently stationed in, or deployed to, the Republic of Korea to support integrated air and missile defense operations in defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan; and (G) an independent risk assessment by the Commander of United States Forces Korea, the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of— (i) the impact of such a reduction on the security of the United States; (ii) the ability of the Armed Forces to execute contingency plans of the Department of Defense, including in support of operations beyond the Korean Peninsula; and (iii) the impact of such a reduction on military training and major military exercises, including on interoperability and joint activities with the Republic of Korea and Japan. (2) In the case of the completion of the transition of wartime operational control of the United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command from United States-led command to Republic of Korea-led command, an assessment by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Commander of United States Forces Korea, the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, the Secretary of State, and the Director of National Intelligence that includes— (A) an assessment of the extent to which the three conditions set forth in the bilaterally determined conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan that was signed on October 31, 2018, will be satisfied prior to the completion of such transition; (B) a detailed description of the manner in which a Republic of Korea-led Combined Forces Command will report to national command authorities in the United States and the Republic of Korea; (C) a detailed description of the planned command relationship between a Republic of Korea-led Combined Forces Command and the United States-led United Nations Command; (D) a description of consultations with countries that have sent military contributions to the United Nations Command; (E) a description of the United States-Republic of Korea wartime operational control consultations with Japan, and an assessment of approaches for deconflicting military operations across the United States-Republic of Korea and the United States-Japan alliances; (F) an assessment of the effect, if any, of the completion of such transition on the potential for nuclear proliferation in the Indo-Pacific region; and (G) an independent military risk assessment by the Commander of United States Forces Korea, the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of such transition. (d) Form (1) Certification A certification described in subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form. (2) Assessment An assessment described in subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex. (e) Quarterly report (1) In general Not later than March 1, 2027, and every 90 days thereafter through 2030, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command and the Commander of United States Forces Korea, shall provide the appropriate committees of Congress with a report on the United States-Republic of Korea roadmap for implementation of the bilateral Conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan, signed on October 31, 2018. (2) Elements Each report required by paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following: (A) The current assessment of the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command and the Commander of United States Forces Korea with respect to the conditions that must be achieved before the Republic of Korea may responsibly assume wartime operational control, including an assessment of the extent to which— (i) the Republic of Korea has acquired and operationalized the military capabilities required to lead the combined defense; (ii) comprehensive alliance response capabilities are sufficient to address nuclear and missile threats by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and (iii) the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region is conducive to a stable transition of wartime operational control. (B) An articulation of the specific military capabilities, and associated numbers or levels of such capabilities, the Republic of Korea must acquire and operationalize in order for— (i) the Republic of Korea to be considered prepared to lead the combined defense; and (ii) comprehensive alliance response capabilities to be considered sufficient to address nuclear and missile threats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. (C) An articulation of the specific military capabilities, and associated numbers or levels of such capabilities, the United States Armed Forces must acquire and operationalize in order for comprehensive alliance response capabilities to be considered sufficient to address nuclear and missile threats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. (D) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate. (f) Appropriate committees of Congress defined In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means— (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.