Department of Defense working group, strategy, and report on ensuring the security, resiliency, and integrity of undersea cables

(a) Working group (1) Convening Not later than March 1, 2026, the Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Joint Staff, the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency, and such other agencies and combatant commands as the Secretary considers relevant, convene a working group— (A) to prepare the report required by subsection (b); (B) to provide the briefing required by subsection (c); and (C) to develop the strategy required by subsection (d). (2) Membership The Working Group shall be composed of participants with relevant background or expertise, as determined by the Secretary, but shall include, at a minimum, the following: (A) At least one individual from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. (B) At least one individual from the Joint Staff. (C) At least one individual from the Defense Information Systems Agency. (3) Chairperson The Secretary, or the Secretary's designee, shall serve as the chairperson of the Working Group. (b) Report (1) Requirement Not later than February 1, 2027, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report— (A) assessing the unique challenges of protecting covered undersea cables and covered cable landing stations from threats posed by the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, naval and shadow fleets of adversaries of the United States, and subsea cable destruction mechanisms and any foreign entity of concern; (B) specifically discussing the implications posed by relevant treaties and customary international law; (C) examining the roles, responsibilities, and limits of the Department of Defense in ensuring the security, resiliency, and integrity of covered undersea cables; (D) identifying gaps in current mechanisms for detection of, prevention of, and response to threats against covered undersea cables and covered cable landing stations; and (E) identifying methods for the Department to create and disseminate lawfare or transparency methods to promote international law and deter future grey zone tactics and declassify instances of adversarial action, as may be appropriate. (2) Matters to be included The report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include a description of each of the following: (A) Past, ongoing, or planned efforts to protect covered undersea cables and covered cable landing stations from espionage, cybersecurity threats, physical damage, and natural disasters. (B) Analysis of the capabilities of adversarial countries, including the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and others, to target, compromise, intercept data transmissions or sensitive information from covered undersea cables. (C) Recommended areas for enhanced collaboration with industry stakeholders, including establishing standards, guidelines, and public-private reporting mechanisms. (D) Assessment of training needs, including the development of a dedicated cadre of covered undersea cable security experts. (E) Identification of resources required for expanded operations and enhanced interagency and international coordination. (F) Recommendations for enhanced collaboration with allied and partner nations, including current best practices and lessons learned. (G) Assessment of the maximum disruption to covered undersea cables and landing stations tolerable for the continuity of critical Department of Defense operations. (H) The practicability of repairing any covered undersea cable within 100 hours, including through the development and use of aerial-deliverable, submersible, splicing robots. (I) The utility and practicability of developing 72-hour deployable portable cable landing stations. (J) Identification of the costs associated with the deployment of anti-tamper sensors. (3) Form The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (c) Briefing Not later than March 15, 2027, the Working Group shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a briefing on the findings and recommendations contained in such report. (d) Strategy Not later than February 1, 2027, the Working Group shall, in consultation with such governmental or non-governmental entities as the Working Group considers appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a strategy to disseminate to allies and partners of the United States, industry, and such other entities as the Working Group considers appropriate to address the threats, gaps, roles, responsibilities, and challenges described in subsection (b)— (1) to address threats to the physical security, cybersecurity resiliency, and integrity of covered undersea cables and covered cable landing stations, including redundancies and response options in the event of multiple or coordinated attacks on cable infrastructure; (2) to enhance the Department of Defense’s international collaboration on matters relating to the security of covered undersea cable and covered cable landing stations, including joint exercises with allies and partners of the United States; (3) to incorporate covered undersea cable security into mission sets and operational planning of relevant combatant commands (COCOMs); (4) to foster engagement with private industry to ensure technological advancements and best practices are leveraged for the protection of covered undersea cable and covered cable landing stations; and (5) to develop lawfare or transparency methods to promote international law and deter future grey zone tactics. (e) Definitions In this section: (1) Appropriate committees of Congress The term appropriate committees of Congress means the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (2) Covered cable landing station The term covered cable landing station means a covered undersea cable landing station in, owned by, or operated by the United States or an ally of the United States. (3) Covered undersea cable The term covered undersea cable means a commercial undersea telecommunications cable landing in, owned by, or operated by the United States or an ally of the United States. (4) Cybersecurity threat The term cybersecurity threat has the meaning given such term in section 2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650). (5) Foreign entity of concern The term foreign entity of concern has the meaning given such term in section 9901 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (15 U.S.C. 4651). (6) Working group The term Working Group means the working group convened pursuant to subsection (b)(1).

(a) Working group (1) Convening Not later than March 1, 2026, the Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Joint Staff, the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency, and such other agencies and combatant commands as the Secretary considers relevant, convene a working group— (A) to prepare the report required by subsection (b); (B) to provide the briefing required by subsection (c); and (C) to develop the strategy required by subsection (d). (2) Membership The Working Group shall be composed of participants with relevant background or expertise, as determined by the Secretary, but shall include, at a minimum, the following: (A) At least one individual from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. (B) At least one individual from the Joint Staff. (C) At least one individual from the Defense Information Systems Agency. (3) Chairperson The Secretary, or the Secretary's designee, shall serve as the chairperson of the Working Group. (b) Report (1) Requirement Not later than February 1, 2027, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report— (A) assessing the unique challenges of protecting covered undersea cables and covered cable landing stations from threats posed by the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, naval and shadow fleets of adversaries of the United States, and subsea cable destruction mechanisms and any foreign entity of concern; (B) specifically discussing the implications posed by relevant treaties and customary international law; (C) examining the roles, responsibilities, and limits of the Department of Defense in ensuring the security, resiliency, and integrity of covered undersea cables; (D) identifying gaps in current mechanisms for detection of, prevention of, and response to threats against covered undersea cables and covered cable landing stations; and (E) identifying methods for the Department to create and disseminate lawfare or transparency methods to promote international law and deter future grey zone tactics and declassify instances of adversarial action, as may be appropriate. (2) Matters to be included The report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include a description of each of the following: (A) Past, ongoing, or planned efforts to protect covered undersea cables and covered cable landing stations from espionage, cybersecurity threats, physical damage, and natural disasters. (B) Analysis of the capabilities of adversarial countries, including the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and others, to target, compromise, intercept data transmissions or sensitive information from covered undersea cables. (C) Recommended areas for enhanced collaboration with industry stakeholders, including establishing standards, guidelines, and public-private reporting mechanisms. (D) Assessment of training needs, including the development of a dedicated cadre of covered undersea cable security experts. (E) Identification of resources required for expanded operations and enhanced interagency and international coordination. (F) Recommendations for enhanced collaboration with allied and partner nations, including current best practices and lessons learned. (G) Assessment of the maximum disruption to covered undersea cables and landing stations tolerable for the continuity of critical Department of Defense operations. (H) The practicability of repairing any covered undersea cable within 100 hours, including through the development and use of aerial-deliverable, submersible, splicing robots. (I) The utility and practicability of developing 72-hour deployable portable cable landing stations. (J) Identification of the costs associated with the deployment of anti-tamper sensors. (3) Form The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (c) Briefing Not later than March 15, 2027, the Working Group shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a briefing on the findings and recommendations contained in such report. (d) Strategy Not later than February 1, 2027, the Working Group shall, in consultation with such governmental or non-governmental entities as the Working Group considers appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a strategy to disseminate to allies and partners of the United States, industry, and such other entities as the Working Group considers appropriate to address the threats, gaps, roles, responsibilities, and challenges described in subsection (b)— (1) to address threats to the physical security, cybersecurity resiliency, and integrity of covered undersea cables and covered cable landing stations, including redundancies and response options in the event of multiple or coordinated attacks on cable infrastructure; (2) to enhance the Department of Defense’s international collaboration on matters relating to the security of covered undersea cable and covered cable landing stations, including joint exercises with allies and partners of the United States; (3) to incorporate covered undersea cable security into mission sets and operational planning of relevant combatant commands (COCOMs); (4) to foster engagement with private industry to ensure technological advancements and best practices are leveraged for the protection of covered undersea cable and covered cable landing stations; and (5) to develop lawfare or transparency methods to promote international law and deter future grey zone tactics. (e) Definitions In this section: (1) Appropriate committees of Congress The term appropriate committees of Congress means the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (2) Covered cable landing station The term covered cable landing station means a covered undersea cable landing station in, owned by, or operated by the United States or an ally of the United States. (3) Covered undersea cable The term covered undersea cable means a commercial undersea telecommunications cable landing in, owned by, or operated by the United States or an ally of the United States. (4) Cybersecurity threat The term cybersecurity threat has the meaning given such term in section 2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650). (5) Foreign entity of concern The term foreign entity of concern has the meaning given such term in section 9901 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (15 U.S.C. 4651). (6) Working group The term Working Group means the working group convened pursuant to subsection (b)(1).